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Abstract—Physical layer security has been recently recognized
as a promising new design paradigm to provide security in
wireless networks. In addition to the existing conventional cryp-
tographic methods, physical layer security exploits the dynamics
of fading channels to enhance secured wireless links. In this
approach, jamming plays a key role by generating noise signals
to confuse the potential eavesdroppers, and significantly improves
quality and reliability of secure communications between le-
gitimate terminals. This article presents theoretical limits and
practical designs of jamming approaches for physical layer se-
curity. In particular, the theoretical limits explore the achievable
secrecy rates of user cooperation based jamming whilst the
centralized, and game theoretic based precoding techniques are
reviewed for practical implementations. In addition, the emerging
wireless energy harvesting techniques are exploited to harvest the
required energy to transmit jamming signals. Future directions
of these approaches, and the associated research challenges are
also briefly outlined.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, the exponential growth of mo-
bile traffic and newly emerging wireless applications introduce
different security risks due to their broadcasting nature. The
secured communication links in traditional wireless networks
are established through conventional cryptographic methods.
However, these methods impose different challenges in terms
of key exchange and distribution, especially in the current
trend of dynamic network configurations. Recently, physical
layer security has been recognised as one of the potential so-
lutions to enhance security in wireless networks by exploiting
characteristics of wireless channels [1]–[4]. In addition, this
novel paradigm complements the conventional cryptographic
methods, and well suits for dynamic networks and distributed
processing techniques.
Physical layer security jamming is a well known approach
to enhance the quality of secure wireless transmissions [5]–[9].
In this technique, additional jamming signals are transmitted to
confuse the potential eavesdroppers or to degrade the decoding
capability of the unintended receivers. These jamming signals
can be introduced by embedding them with the intended
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signals, which are referred as artificial noise (AN) approach in
the literature. On the other hand, a receiver can be also used
to transmit jamming signals with the help of full duplex (FD)
radios, which have the capability to simultaneously transmit
and receive the signals. Hence, FD receiver can be exploited to
receive the required signals while sending jamming signals at
the same time to confuse the eavesdroppers [6]. However, this
transmit and receive jamming scheme might not be possible
under all circumstances due to limited available number of
antennas and the strong self-interference (SI). In this scenario,
the external nodes can be employed to send jamming signals,
where they could be relay nodes or private jammers [10]–
[12]. In case of private jammers, they could introduce charges
for their dedicated jamming services. The problems associated
with these private jammers can be formulated into different
game theoretic problems by considering the legitimate nodes
and the private jammers as the players of the game.
This article focuses on physical layer security jamming
techniques based on user cooperations and external nodes.
Firstly, theoretical limits of jamming through user cooperation
is presented, and then multi-antenna based jamming techniques
are reviewed by exploiting their spatial diversity and degrees
of freedom (DoF). For example, the advantages of jamming
with multi-antenna transmitter can be easily demonstrated by
appropriately designing beamformers such that it would cause
a significant interference to the eavesdroppers while no or
less interference leakage to the intended receivers. However,
the study of theoretical limits of jamming and the practical
designs are necessary to achieve the optimal performance
in secrecy networks. This article presents these theoretical
limits and design approaches as follows. First, theoretical
limits of user cooperation based jamming are explored. Then,
centralized and game theoretic based multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) transmit and receive precoding techniques are
discussed to provide efficient jamming services. In addition,
wireless energy harvesting (WEH) based jamming techniques
are presented through the recent advancement in simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) concept.
Finally, future research challenges of jamming schemes are
briefly discussed.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC LIMITS OF JAMMING
In this section, we present the theoretical limits of
cooperative-users based jamming for physical layer security.
The concept of cooperative jamming (CJ) was introduced in
[5] for a Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (GMAC-
WT) from an information-theoretic aspect. In the GMAC-
WT channel, multiple legitimate users wish to send secret
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Fig. 1: (a) The wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-
HI). (b) The WT-HI channel with artificial state.
messages to a common receiver in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper. In order to maximize all the sum secrecy rate,
a user should send pure Gaussian noise as long as the eaves-
dropping channel from it to the eavesdropper is stronger than
the legitimate channel from it to the intended receiver. The
CJ scheme can be illustrated via a simple two-user GMAC-
WT channel as shown in Fig. 1, where a transmitter (Alice)
wishes to send a secret message W1 to the intended receiver
(Bob) under the help of an interferer (Carlo), without leaking
any information to the eavesdropper (Eve). The channel gains
from Alice to Bob and Eve are normalized to be 1 and
√
a; the
channel gains from Carlo to Bob and Eve are normalized to be√
b and 1. Note that the channel gains from Alice to Bob and
from Carlo to Eve are different with each other although both
of them are normalized to 1, which is reflected by the fact that
both the channels have different effects on the received signal-
noise-ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve. This channel model is
also called the wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-
HI) in [13]. When b < 1, Carlo can help Alice and Bob
to enhance the security level by sending Gaussian noise that
is independent of the message-carrying signal. This can be
interpreted by the fact that Carlo’s jamming signal harms Eve
more than Bob when b < 1, which may improve the achievable
secrecy rate.
CJ is useful only when b < 1 in the WT-HI channel in Fig.
1 (a). But, when b > 1, i.e., Carlo has a stronger channel to
Bob than to Eve, CJ in [5] might not be useful. In this case,
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Fig. 2: Achievable secrecy rates of the IA and AS-based
schemes for the WT-HI channel shown in Fig. 1 (a), where
the maximum transmit power at Alice and Carlo are 20 and
50, respectively. Since the IA scheme is a generalization of
the CJ and NF scheme, its achievable secrecy rate is the same
as that of the CJ scheme when b < 1 and the same as that of
the NF scheme when b > 1.
Carlo can still help Alice and Bob using the noise forwarding
(NF) scheme in [14]. In NF, Carlo can randomly choose a
codeword from a known codebook with an appropriate coding
rate such that the confusion signal can be decoded by Bob
before the decoding of W1, and hence, without affecting the
message-carrying signal, still jams the eavesdropping channel.
An interpretation of NF is that the independent confusion
codewords can bring additional randomness to the channel to
enhance the security level. The main difference between NF
and CJ is that, the former designs the confusion signals with
structure that does not jam Bob, whereas the latter uses pure
noise that jams Bob and Eve simultaneously.
Both CJ and NF can be generalized into a unified framework
based on the adaptive adjustment of the coding rate at Carlo,
which is called interference assisted (IA) scheme in [13] for
the WT-HI channel. The main difference between the IA and
NF schemes is that, in the former, Carlo treats its coding
rate as a variable, and adaptively adjusts this coding rate
to maximize the achievable secrecy rate; while in the latter,
Carlo always chooses a coding rate such that the interference
transmitted by him does not affect Bob. Both CJ and NF can
be viewed as the special cases of the IA scheme. When the
coding rate at Carlo is lower than a certain rate such that
Bob can decode the interference before decoding the secret
message, the IA scheme reduces to NF; when the coding rate
at Carlo is sufficiently large such that both Bob and Eve have
no choice but to treat the interference as pure noise, the IA
scheme reduces to CJ.
CJ and NF can also be generalized by the channel prefixing
scheme in secure communications. As shown in the Gaussian
WT-HI channel in Fig. 1 (a), the confusion signal transmitted
by Carlo can consist of two parts, i.e., X2 = U2 +Z2, where
3one part (U2) is the codeword with the structure following the
NF scheme, and the other part (Z2) is pure Gaussian noise
following the CJ scheme. In this channel prefixing scheme,
the channel input X2 at Carlo becomes a noisy version of
the interference codeword U2 in terms of the Markov chain
U2−X2−Y1, Y2. In addition to Carlo’s channel prefixing, the
work in [15] also adopted a channel prefixing scheme at Alice
based on artificial state (AS), and the achievable secrecy rate
can be further enhanced. Specifically, Alice spends part of its
transmit power to generate an AS S1, i.e., it sets the channel
input as X1 = X˜1 + S1 as shown in Fig. 1 (b). Now, the
WT-HI channel in Fig. 1 (a) becomes a WT-HI channel with
state information as shown in Fig. 1 (b), where the random
state S1 is known by Alice a priori and X˜1 can be viewed as
the virtual channel input. Then following the concept of dirty
paper coding (DPC), we introduce an auxiliary variable U1 =
X˜1 + βS1 as the message-carrying codeword. According to
DPC, S1 will not affect the decoding of the message-carrying
codeword U1 at Bob by appropriately setting the value of β.
Fig. 2 shows achievable secrecy rates of the IA and AS-
based schemes for the WT-HI channel shown in Fig. 1 (a),
where the maximum normalized transmit power at Alice and
Carlo are 20 and 50. For both schemes, Gaussian codebooks
are adopted, where the message-bared signal X1 ∼ N (0, P1),
and the Gaussian interference X2 ∼ N (0, P2), 0 ≤ P1 ≤ 20,
0 ≤ P2 ≤ 50. Furthermore, the AS-based scheme sets X˜1 ∼
(0, (1 − λ)P1), S1 ∼ (0, λP1). The optimal values of these
parameters (P1, P2, λ) are established via exhaustive searches.
As shown in Fig. 2, when a > 1, the AS at Alice is important
to get a larger secrecy rate if compared with the NF (or IA)
scheme. Particularly, when b = 1, Carlo can still assist Alice
to achieve a positive secrecy rate, whereas the CJ, NF and IA
schemes fail. This can be interpreted by the fact that the AS
at Alice can associate with the helping interference at Carlo to
further confuse Eve without affecting Bob. Fig. 2 also shows
that the gap between the AS-based and the NF schemes can
be enlarged by increasing a from 1 to 7. Moreover, the AS-
based scheme reduces to the CJ (or IA) scheme when b < 1/a,
thanks to the channel prefixing at Carlo.
The works in [5], [13]–[15] used information-theoretical
Gaussian codebooks with infinite alphabets, which is hard
to implement in practice. Alternatively, the work in [16] has
proposed an achievable scheme based on layered nested lattice
codes with an finite alphabets. Interestingly, unlike traditional
communications without secrecy constraints, the use of more
practical lattice codes can outperform the Gaussian code-
book for the channel model in Fig. 1 (a) for certain cases.
Specifically, the scheme in [16] can achieve non-zero secure
degree of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for all values of channel gain pair
(
√
a,
√
b) except when ab = 1, whereas the works in [5],
[13]–[15] fail to achieve non-zero s.d.o.f.. This is because,
based on nested lattice codes, the signals transmitted by both
the source and the cooperative jammer can be aligned at the
eavesdropper but remain separable at the intended receiver;
whereas the Gaussian noise transmitted by the cooperative
jammer simultaneously interferes with the eavesdropper, and
hurts the intended receive.
III. MIMO JAMMING: CENTRALIZED APPROACH
In this section, we review key results of using MIMO to
transmit judiciously jamming signals with an aim to achieve
higher secrecy rate. Specifically, centralized transmit and
receive jamming techniques are discussed in the following
subsections.
A. Transmit Jamming
Consider a basic three-node system, which consists of a
transmitter, an intended receiver and an eavesdropper. The
transmitter has multiple antennas, while the receiver and the
eavesdropper may have multiple antennas or a single antenna.
The secrecy capacity is well known [1] when the channel
state information (CSI) is available to all nodes. While it is
reasonable to assume to have the receiver’s CSI, it is usually
unrealistic to obtain the eavesdropper’s CSI. In the case where
only the receiver’s CSI is known but the eavesdropper’s CSI
is absent, the transmit jamming or AN is an effective means
to improve the secrecy rate. As shown in Fig. 3 (a), the
total transmit signal is split into two parts. The first one is
the information-bearing message towards the direction of the
receiver, which can be designed based on the receiver’s CSI.
The second part is the transmit jamming, which is isotropic
Gaussian noise in the orthogonal space of the receiver’s
channel. By doing so, the transmit jamming does not affect the
intended receiver but only degrades the quality of the signal
received by the eavesdropper. A remarkable result about this
simple transmit jamming scheme shown in [1] is that, it can
achieve secrecy rate close to the capacity in the high SNR
regime when the receiver has a single antenna.
The use of transmit jamming consumes some transmit
power so it reduces the SNR at the receiver. Therefore it
is important to allocate power to the information-bearing
signals and the jamming signals properly. While it is in
general difficult to achieve the optimal power allocation, a
general rule of thumb is to allocate more power to jamming
when the receiver’s CSI is more accurate or the number
of the eavesdropper’s antennas increases to achieve effective
jamming.
B. Receive Jamming
Transmit jamming is useful but requires the support of
multiple antennas. When the transmitter has a single antenna,
is it still possible to take advantage of jamming? Fortunately,
there is a positive answer to this question. One possible
solution is to use jamming at the receiver side to confuse
the eavesdropper. There are different implementations. For
instance, the transmitter repeats the transmission for a certain
times, and the receiver randomly jams the transmissions [17].
Because the eavesdropper does not know which transmission
is left unjammed, it cannot decode the message correctly. One
drawback of this scheme is that, it requires retransmission,
which is less bandwidth efficient and may be critical for delay-
sensitive applications. Next we introduce a receive jamming
scheme without using retransmissions.
Traditionally a wireless node works in the half-duplex (HD)
mode. The FD operation, which allows a wireless node to
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Fig. 3: MIMO Jamming. (a) Transmit jamming when the transmitter has multiple antennas; (b) Receive jamming when the
receiver has multiple antennas and works in the FD mode.
transmit and receive simultaneously in the same frequency
band has emerged as an attractive solution to improve the
spectral efficiency. The FD operation has also shown great
potential to improve physical layer security. As depicted in
Fig. 3(b), the main idea is that the intended receiver sends
jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel and
protect its own reception [6]. Obviously the receive jamming
will affect both the intended receiver itself and the eaves-
dropper because of the resulting SI, but if the SI can be
well controlled/optimized, it will favor the intended receiver.
When the receiver has multiple transmit or receive antennas,
it can employ joint transmit and receive beamforming for
simultaneous signal detection, SI suppression and jamming
emission. An interesting result in [6] is that when the global
CSI is available, the secrecy rate increases unbounded as the
SNR goes up, which is in contrast to the traditional HD case
without receive jamming. Even when only statistical informa-
tion about the eavesdropper’s channel is known, substantial
secrecy rate improvement is observed. Obviously, transmit
and receive jamming can be combined to further improve the
secrecy rate in a MIMO wiretap channel. In addition, both
of these jamming techniques can be directly applied to the
relay jamming schemes, where a set of trusted half-duplex
or full-duplex relays can help the communication between
legitimate terminals while introducing jamming signals to the
eavesdroppers. The half-duplex relays could introduce artificial
noise to the eavesdroppers while transmitting the signal to
the legitimate users. On the other hand, the full-duplex relays
could transmit jamming signal, while receiving the signals
from the source. Specifically, the artificial noise approach with
half-duplex relays can be considered as the transmit jamming,
whereas the receive jamming represents the full-duplex relay
based jamming scheme.
IV. MIMO JAMMING: GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
In this section, we review game theoretic based jamming
approaches for physical layer security. The centralized
transmitter-receiver based jamming schemes discussed in
the previous section might not be able to achieve the
required performance under all circumstances due to channel
Player 1 
Interference Price (µ) Interference Power (p) 
Player 2 
Transmitter Jammers 
!"#$!%#$&#$
'()(*+($
'()(*+($
(a)
Fig. 4: (a) A MIMO secrecy network with multiple eavesdrop-
pers and private jammers. (b) The concept of equilibrium for
the transmitter-private jammers game.
conditions and the strong SI. In this scenario, external
jammers can be employed to improve the quality of the
secure communications by introducing jamming signals to
the eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 4 (a) [10]–[12]. However,
these external (private) jammers charge for their dedicated
jamming services from the transmitter based on the amount
of interference caused at the eavesdroppers. In order to
compensate these prices, the transmitter introduces charges
for its enhanced secure transmission from the legitimate
users. In this scenario, both the transmitter and the private
jammers compete to maximize their revenues by providing
higher secrecy rates at the legitimate users and selling the
interference to the transmitter, respectively.
In order to analyze the interactions between the
transmitter and the private jammers, game theory provides
the mathematical structure and concepts to formulate this
scenario into different games, where both the transmitter
and the private jammers will be the players of the game
[18]. In addition, analytical results obtained through these
games based on the strategic decisions of the players will
help to conclude whether there is an equilibrium in their
revenues for the proposed game as shown in Fig. 4(b), at
5which both players achieve their maximum revenues. On
the other hand, achieving these equilibria among the players
might introduce more complexity in the network, even though
they are beneficial for all players. To circumvent these
complexity issues, game theory also facilitates to develop
distributed and low complexity based implementation to attain
these equilibria. Based on whether it is a collaboration or
competition among the players, these games can be classified
into cooperative and non-cooperative games, respectively
[18].
A secrecy network model is considered with one transmitter
and one legitimate user, where private jammers help to
improve the secure transmission by causing interference to
the eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 4(a). The transmitter, the
legitimate user and the private jammers are all equipped with
multiple antennas. As mentioned earlier, the interaction of
buying interference from private jammers and announcing
interference prices to the transmitter can be formulated
into a Stackelberg game, where the private jammers and
the transmitter are the leaders (Player 1) and the follower
(Player 2) of the game, respectively [18]. In order to study
this game, the best responses of both the players should be
derived, where the best interference requirements for a given
interference price and the best interference price for a given
interference requirements will be obtained at both the players.
Based on these best responses, the Stackelberg equilibrium can
be achieved by deriving the optimal interference requirement
and the interference prices. At this equilibrium as shown in
Fig. 4(b), both of the players will achieve their maximum
revenues and the deviation of any player from this equilibrium
will cause a loss in their revenues. This equilibrium can be
implemented by exchanging the associated channel responses
between the transmitter and the private jammers. However, this
might introduce more complexity in the network. Therefore,
a distributed implementation of this equilibrium would
be more appropriate to reduce the complexity, where the
interference prices offered by the jammers and the interference
requirements at the transmitter can be iteratively updated [10].
The secrecy network might consist of multiple legitimate
multi-antenna transmitter-receiver pairs as well as a friendly
jammer in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In this
scenario, each pair tries to maximize its secrecy rate with
the help of the friendly jammer by introducing interference to
the eavesdroppers. However, the jamming signals will cause
interference not only to the eavesdroppers but also to the
destinations, which will degrade the secrecy rate performance.
Therefore, the jammer should distribute its power among the
users such that the secrecy rate performance is improved.
These interactions between the pairs and the jammer can be
formulated into an auction game, where the transmitters and
the jammer will be the bidders and auctioneer [18], respec-
tively. The transmitters will submit their bids to the jammer
depending on the payment of the corresponding jammer-power
and the secrecy rate improvement whereas the jammer will
determine the optimal power allocations between the users
based on these bids. For this game, a distributed solution can
be developed by exploiting the distributed auction theoretic
approach, where the bids from the transmitters and power
allocations between the users will be updated iteratively.
V. ENHANCING PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN WIRELESS
ENERGY HARVESTING NETWORKS
Since there has been an upsurge of research interest as
well as emerging applications for radio-frequency (RF) signal-
enabled wireless energy transfer, which avails the broadcasting
and far-field radiative properties of electromagnetic (EM) wave
to power wireless devices in particular, while transferring
information, new challenges as well as opportunities for
physical layer security begin arising in these WEH-enabled
networks. In this section, we discuss the-state-of-art technolo-
gies enhancing physical layer security for one important class
of WEH application, i.e., wireless powered communication
network (WPCN).
Physical layer security issues in the rapidly developed
cooperative networks such as device-to-device systems, relay
networks etc., have already drawn significant attention and
inter alia, CJ has been widely studied as a promising tech-
nology [5], [7]. However, the benefits of CJ would be quite
compromised if those energy-limited potential helpers are
unwilling to cooperate. In the following, we introduce how this
bottleneck could be broken with self-sustainable terminals in
a WPCN. Benefiting from dense radio-frequency (RF) signals
of increasing amount of data transmission in the cooperative
networks, a newly designed two-phase protocol, i.e., harvest-
and-jam (HJ) was proposed in [19] to achieve secrecy trans-
mission by CJ and yet not to add extra power cost. Specifically,
as illustrated in Fig. 5, in the first transmission phase, a single-
antenna transmitter sends confidential information to a multi-
antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay with conventional
power supply and simultaneously transfers power to a group
of idle multi-antenna users serving as helpers; in the second
transmission phase, the AF relay amplifies, and forwards the
message to the legitimate receiver under the protection of
jamming, which is generated from each of the helpers by
its harvested power in the previous transmission phase. The
secrecy rate is maximized by optimizing the transmit beam-
forming matrix for the AF relay and the jamming covariance
matrices for each of the helpers subject to transmit power
constraints, under circumstances of perfect and imperfect CSI
available at the coordinating node, respectively. The results
in [19] showed that the HJ scheme plays a prominent role
in improving secret communications in practical scenarios of
imperfect CSI. Especially, when CSIs related to the eavesdrop-
per are hard to obtain and more imperfect than those related
to the legitimate users, the optimal power allocation scheme
inclines to jam the eavesdropper using all available power, and
hence considerably degrades its information reception while
minimizing the interference caused to the legitimate receiver.
Typically, in a WPCN setup where helpers are fixed and
evenly distributed around a disk centered on the transmitter
with radius 2m , assuming a simple channel fading model
comprising Rayleigh fading and pathloss given by ( d
d0
)−α,
given the reference distance d0 = 1m and the attenuation
factor α = 3, if the transmit power is set to be 0dBm and the
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First transmission phase Energy Transfer
JammingSecond transmission phase
Fig. 5: A WPCN model employing harvest-and-jam (HJ)
protocol.
energy conversion efficiency is 50%, the average per-antenna
harvested power at each helper is around 62.5µW.
Besides increasing the secrecy rate (short-term metric) via
adaptive power allocation over antennas for AF beamform-
ing and jamming signal design, [20] considered a similar
idea of increasing the confidential information transmission
throughput (long-term metric) via a wireless-powered friendly
jammer by proposing a delicately designed protocol with not
necessarily equal time duration for the “harvest” and “jam”
phases. Specifically, defining a “power transfer (PT)” block
for the jammer to harvest energy from the source and an
“information transmission (IT)” block for confidential infor-
mation to be transmitted under the protection of a jamming
signal, a threshold amount of energy, i.e., PJT , which supports
jamming using power PJ for a transmission block of T
time unit, is examined at the jammer’s battery storage at
the beginning of each transmission block. Only when this
threshold is achieved, and meanwhile the source-destination
(main channel) does not suffer from communications outage,
the IT block with jamming starts. Otherwise, the transmission
enters into either dedicated PT block (when the threshold
condition is not satisfied) or opportunistic PT block (when
communication outage over the main channel occurs). Based
on this protocol design, four types of PT-IT cycles consisting
of varied combination of these blocks are characterized, and
as a result, the long-term behavior of this stochastic process
has been analyzed with a closed-form achievable throughput.
Finally, the design parameters, PJ and the fixed transmission
rates are optimized to further maximize the secrecy throughput
under the constraint of the secrecy outage probability.
VI. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In this section, we provide future research challenges as-
sociated with the physical layer security jamming schemes
discussed in the previous sections.
A. Theoretical limits
Though existing works have proposed a variety of jamming
schemes to enhance security level, the secrecy capacity has
not been found even for the simple WT-HI channel in Fig. 1.
Future work of interest is to design more intelligent coding
schemes to achieve the secrecy capacity. For example, though
the AS-based scheme in [15] showed that the channel prefixing
technique is crucial to improve the achievable secrecy rate,
the effects of channel prefixing has not been fully revealed.
Moreover, this paper only considers the jamming schemes
based on Gaussian random coding, which cannot achieve a
positive secure DoF at high SNR, while recent works have
shown that the non-Gaussian codes (e.g., structured codes) can
achieve a positive secure DoF at high SNR. Hence the design
of non-Gaussian codes is also an interesting future research
area.
B. Smart MIMO jamming
The majority of literature assumes ideal Gaussian signalling
and therefore the optimal jamming also uses Gaussian sig-
nalling. However, Gaussian signalling is not practical and
wireless systems often employ constant envelop signalling
schemes like phase-shift-keying (PSK). In this case, it is shown
that Gaussian jamming is no longer effective, and can be
removed by the multi-antenna eavesdropper using blind source
separation techniques such as constant modulus algorithms
[21]. Therefore, there is a need to design the smart jamming
signals adaptive to the specific constellation used.
Massive MIMO is a great enabler to achieve spectrum-efficient
and energy-efficient wireless communications. However, its
security implication is not well understood. Our previous work
shows that massive MIMO systems, if carefully designed, are
actually quite robust against both passive and active attacks
[22]. Further investigation is needed to understand its potential
to effectively jam the eavesdroppers.
C. Robust jamming games
Effective jamming requires perfect CSI, which is difficult to
obtain in practice. Imperfect CSI may not only degrade the per-
formance of the legitimate communications but also results in
information leakage to the eavesdroppers. In order to deal with
this issue, it is necessary to consider robust transmit jamming
to achieve guaranteed outage performance of the secrecy rate.
Most of the game theoretic approaches proposed for physical
layer security have been assumed that the players have the
perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers. In order to overcome the
imperfect CSI issues associated with eavesdroppers in the
existing games, robust techniques should be considered for
secure communications. Therefore, the development of robust
jamming games by incorporating channel uncertainties or the
cases of no eavesdroppers’ CSI along with the corresponding
analysis of equilibria would be very challenging. These robust
jamming games could be formulated into Bayesian games,
which are well known for the scenarios with incomplete in-
formation. The jamming games with imperfect eavesdroppers
CSI would be one of the possible interesting future directions
in game theoretic based jamming for physical layer security.
D. Wireless energy harvesting
More sophisticated transmission protocols incorporating
adaptive power/rate designs are expected to be studied for fur-
7ther improving the long-term secrecy throughput in [20]. Be-
sides, to further motivate the potential WEH-enabled helpers
to assist secure communications, more practical energy and
communications mechanism needs to be properly designed.
For example, neighbour-users of the transmitter could be
self-interested and prefer to storing the harvested energy for
their own use rather than help jam. In this situation, the
transmitter needs to offer some spare communications resource
as incentives, such as spectrum, to increase the cooperation
utility and reduce the overall system cost.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, the jamming techniques for physical layer
security have been discussed with different approaches. In
particular, the theoretical limits of user cooperation based
jamming and the practical designs of MIMO jamming as
well as the game theoretic based jamming techniques have
been reviewed. In addition, the WEH based jamming has
also been presented for improving energy efficiency in secure
communications by exploiting the wireless harvested energy to
generate jamming signals to the eavesdroppers. Finally, future
research challenges of these jamming schemes for physical
layer security have been briefly outlined.
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